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NOTES
The Colorization of Black and White Films: An Example
of the Lack of Substantive Protection for Art
in the United States
Movies have long been regarded as an integral part of the artistic
and cultural heritage of the United States. As original works of author-
ship, motion pictures receive the same protection under United States
copyright law as novels, plays, paintings, sculptures, musical pieces and
other forms of original expression.1 In the United States, copyright law
protects the economic rights of a copyright holder in original works of
authorship.2 Copyright law fails, however, to protect the integrity of an
author's3 vision and expression when the author no longer holds the eco-
nomic rights to the work.4 In the motion picture industry, the lack of
copyright protection for an author's creative expression has again be-
come a matter of concern with the introduction of computerized tech-
niques for adding color to black and white films.5
1 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Original works of authorship include:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
Congressional authority for the extensive copyright provisions stems from U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8, which gives Congress the power "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries ......
2 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) gives the copyright holder of an original work of authorship the exclu-
sive right to reproduce the work, to prepare derivative works, to distribute the work, to perform the
work and to display the work.
3 For the purposes of this note, the term "author" refers to the creative force behind an artistic
or literary work.
4 United States copyright protection does not recognize the personal right of an author in a
creative work but rather focuses on what the framers of the Constitution perceived as the societal
benefits that result from providing authors with incentives to continue their artistic expression by
giving them exclusive rights to the economic benefits of their work. For a discussion of the purpose
of copyright protection in the United States, see 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A]
(1987) (hereinafter cited as NIMMER). See also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954); Fox Film Corp. v.
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). The history of United States copyright law thus contrasts with the
copyright protection provided in many European countries which recognize an author's economic
and personal interests in an artistic work as natural rights. See DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral
Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y. 1, 7-
17 (1980); Hauhart, Natural Law Basis for the Copyright Doctrine of Droit Moral, 30 CATm. LAw. 53, 58-69
(1985); Rosen, Artists' Moral Rights: A European Evolution, An American Revolution, 2 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENTERTAINMENT L. J. 155, 176-79.
5 For a discussion of colorizing techniques and their effect on black and white films, see infra
notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Protection for the creative element of an author's work stems from a
concept of moral right found in the copyright laws of many European
countries and made a part of the Berne Convention For the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works (the Berne Convention).6 The United States
does not adhere to the Berne multilateral treaty and does not expressly
recognize a concept of moral right.7 Instead, the United States relies on
general copyright principles and theories under contract, unfair competi-
tion, defamation, and privacy as well as application of § 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act, in order to provide authors of creative works with some
protection for their creative efforts.8 This note will examine the concept
of moral right as embodied in the Berne Convention and its United
States equivalents in the context of the colorization of black and white
films. Part I will give an overview of the doctrine of moral right as it
evolved in Europe and under the Berne Convention and will compare
the European model to the protection given to art in the United States.
Part II will apply these concepts to issues involving the colorization of
6 The Berne Convention For the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works is a multilateral
treaty administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization. Ten nations signed the first
treaty on September 9, 1886. Since that time, the treaty has undergone several revisions of which
the Paris Text of July 24, 1971 is the most recent. Currently seventy-six countries have ratified
Berne with the United States as the most conspicuous non-member. 3 NiMMER, supra note 4, at
§ 17.04[D]. For a list of those nations which adhere to Berne, see 4 NIMMER, supra note 4, at app. 22.
The two other major countries which still have not joined are the People's Republic of China and the
Soviet Union. For a discussion of the possibility of U.S. adherence, see The Implications, Both Domestic
and International, of U. S. Adherence to the International Union For the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1985-1986) (hereinafter cited as Hearings).
A doctrine of moral right became a part of the Berne Convention at the Rome Conference of
1928. Article 6bis now provides that:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to,
the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall,
after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be
exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of the country where
the protection is claimed. However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of
their ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection after the
death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding paragraph may provide that
some of these rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be gov-
erned by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
The Berne Convention For the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Text, July 24, 1971,
art. 6bis (hereinafter cited as Paris Text) reprinted in 4 NiMMER, supra note 4, at app. 27.
7 The United States is a member of the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC), an interna-
tional treaty administered by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO). While the United States withdrew from UNESCO in 1984, it remains a party to the
UCC. The UCC does not specifically provide for the protection of moral rights but rather leaves
such protection to the discretion of its member nations individually. For the complete text of the
UCC, see 4 NIMMER, supra note 4, at apps. 24 & 25. For a list of member nations, see id at app. 21.
Those who recommend that the United States join the Berne Convention note that while the United
States still has some say in the governing of the UCC, its loss of control over UNESCO programs
may prove detrimental to copyright protection in the future. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 124-25
(statement of Donald J. Quigg, Acting Commissioner for Patents and Trademarks).
8 Some commentators suggest that these theories provide sufficient protection for the moral
rights of authors to enable the United States to join the Berne Convention without further legisla-
tion in this area. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
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black and white films to see what protection a doctrine of moral right
would afford as well as what protection currently exists. Part III will ex-
amine legislative efforts to protect black and white films and to imple-
ment a doctrine of moral right in the United States. Part IV will conclude
that United States law currently does not provide adequate protection for
art and will recommend adoption of legislative remedies.
I. The Doctrine of Moral Right
A doctrine of moral right as embodied in the Berne Convention and
the copyright statutes of its signatory countries protects the right of an
author to instill a creative work with aspects of her own personality. 9 To
protect the personal side of a creative work, the Berne Convention ex-
pressly gives the author two basic rights: (1) the right to claim author-
ship; 10 and (2) the right to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of the author's work or any other derogatory action with
respect to such work" if such conduct would prejudice the author's
honor or reputation. 12 Both of these rights are independent of any eco-
nomic rights in the work and thus do not necessarily terminate with the
transfer of the copyright in the work.' 3
While the United States does not adhere to the Berne Convention, it
-does protect certain aspects of an author's expression through variations
on areas such as copyright, contract, defamation, privacy, and unfair
competition as well as through application of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act
(the Lanham Act). 14
9 The doctrine of moral right, while not embodied in the Berne Convention until 1928, stems
from concepts which have existed for much longer in several European countries, predating even the
recognition of economic rights. I S. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTIS-
TIC PROPERTY 577-81 (1938). Countries such as France and Italy have long viewed the protection of
an author's artistic expression as a natural right of the author. Under French law, which provides the
most extensive protection, the "droit moral" encompasses four rights: (1) droit de divulgation, the
right of an author to determine whether to publish; (2) droit de retrait ou de repentir, the right of an
author to withdraw or alter a work already made public; (3) droit a 'la paternite', the right of an
author to claim authorship of her work or to disclaim authorship of another's work; and (4) droit au
respect del 'oeuvre, the right of an author to object to the alteration, mutilation, distortion, or exces-
sive criticism of her work. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 3-4; see also 2 NiMMER supra note 4, at § 8.2 1[A].
10 Paris Text, supra note 6, at art. 6bis. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
I 1 Paris Text, supra note 6, at art. 6bis. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
12 Professor Nimmer, using the Stockholm revisions as a guide, divided moral rights into three
categories: (1) the right to claim authorship; (2) the right to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other alteration of the work; and (3) the right to object to any other action in relation to the work
which would be prejudicial to the author's honor or reputation. Nimmer, Implications ofthe Prospective
Revisions of the Berne Convention and the United States. Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499, 520 (1967).
This view gives an author a broader array of rights since the right to object to any distortion, mutila-
tion or other alteration of the work exists independently of the need to show possible prejudicial
effect to the author's honor or reputation. The 1971 Paris Text, however, leaves such an interpreta-
tion untenable. After the Paris Conference, art. 6bis combines the right to object to distortion, muti-
lation or modification with the right to object to other derogatory actions and connects both to the
need to show prejudicial effect to the honor or reputation of the author, thus considerably narrowing
the rights of the author. The original moral rights clause added by the Rome Conference also con-
nected the right to object to distortion, mutilation or modification of an author's work with the
prejudicial effect of such conduct.
13 Paris Text, supra note 6, at art. 6bis. For a discussion of the alienability of these rights, see
infra notes 18 & 50 and accompanying text.
14 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
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A. Right to Claim Authorship
Countries subject to the Berne Convention commonly recognize
three distinct rights under the general right to claim authorship. 15 These
rights, together commonly known as the right of paternity, include:
(1) the right to require that the author's work carry the author's name;
(2) the right to prohibit the use of another's name in connection with the
author's work; and (3) the right to prohibit the use of the author's name
in connection with a work that the author did not create.' 6 These rights
do not require a showing of possible harm to the author's honor or repu-
tation, but rather focus on the unique relationship between the author
and her work.' 7 Because of the personal nature of these rights, they sur-
vive even the transfer of economic interests in the work and cannot be
assigned or otherwise alienated.' 8 This protection exists during the au-
thor's life and continues at least fifty years after her death.' 9
The well-established characteristics of the right to claim authorship
under the Berne Convention distinguish this right from similar but less
clearly formed protection in the United States. Although the United
States does not expressly recognize a doctrine of moral right or the right
to claim authorship as defined in the Berne Convention, United States
law does provide some protection under various other legal theories.20
15 The Berne Convention sets the minimum standards pursuant to which signatory countries
must mold their copyright protection. Each country determines the form and level of protection
beyond the minimum standards. Nimmer, supra note 12, at 523.
16 Nimmer, supra note 12, at 520. See also Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of
Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARv. L. REv. 554, 561-62 (1940). In addition, some commentators
list under the right of paternity, the right of an author to insist on the use ofa nom de plume and the
right of an author to remove her name from distorted or mutilated versions of her work. See DaSilva,
supra note 4, at 28; Hathaway, American Law Analogues to the Paternity Element of the Doctrine of Moral
Right: Is the Creative Artist in America Really Protected? 30 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 121, 125
(1983).
17 Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J.
ComP. L. 465, 478-79 (1968). The right of paternity stems from personal aspects of the act of crea-
tion. An author infuses her work with part of her personality. Thus the author's name stands for
more than who owns the work. The author's name connects the author to this unique personal
expression. Any misuse of the author's name breaks this connection. See generally id. at 465; I S.
LADAS, supra note 9, at 585-86.
18 Under art. 6bis of the Berne Convention, moral rights exist "[i]ndependently of the author's
economic rights," and continue even after the transfer of the economic rights. Paris Text, supra note
6, at art. 6bis. The Berne Convention does not clearly indicate whether the author can expressly
transfer moral rights along with economic rights. At least with respect to the right of paternity, some
commentators indicate that an author cannot alienate her fights. See I S. LADAS, supra note 9, at 599.
Some countries like France expressly take this view. Sarraute, supra note 17, at 478-79. With respect
to the alienability of the right of integrity, see infra note 50 and accompanying text.
19 Art. 6bis (2) provides that moral rights shall exist at least as long as the economic rights which
pursuant to Art. 7 last for the life of the author and continue fifty years after the author's death.
Paris Text, supra note 6, at art. 6bis. Several countries, including France and Italy, protect moral
rights beyond this minimum term. Each country determines who is to enforce an author's moral
rights after the author's death. Some countries allow the author's heirs to enforce such rights as
long as they do so in accordance with the author's interests. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 14-15. Berne
countries also commonly give a public or governmental agency the power to exercise a deceased
author's moral rights on behalf of the author. Gantz, Protecting Artists'Moral Rights: A Critique of the
California Art Preservation Act as a Model for Statutory Reform, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 873, 889, n.117
(1981). See also Sarraute, supra note 17, at 486.
20 See infra notes .21-46 and accompanying text. "American copyright law, as presently written,
does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks to
vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors." Gilliam v. American Broadcast-
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In the United States, an author's right to claim authorship of a work
exists only to the extent that the author retains the copyright in the work
or contracts to receive recognition. 21 United States copyright law pro-
vides that the author of an original work has exclusive rights of publica-
tion and reproduction.22  Through exclusive publication and
reproduction, the author can insure that her name remains associated
with her work as long as she retains the copyright.23 If the author trans-
fers the copyright, however, the transferee does not have to publish the
author's name in connection with the work, unless the author contractu-
ally retains such a right.24 Generally, courts broadly interpret contracts
which transfer copyright interests. Often they will deem the author to
have relinquished the right to have her name associated with the work
even if the parties did not expressly agree to such a provision. 25
While an author who transfers the copyright in a creative work with-
out retaining any interest cannot compel recognition, she may still pro-
hibit the use of another's name in connection with the work under a
theory of unfair competition or through application of the Lanham Act.26
ing Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) See also Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir.
1947); 2 NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 8.2 1[B].
21 2 NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 8.2 1[E] See also Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc. 295 F. Supp. 331
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Roeder, supra note 16, at 564.
22 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Copyright law provides certain limitations to these exclusive rights
including fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982); reproduction by libraries and archives under 17
U.S.C. § 108 (1982); and certain educational uses under 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1982).
23 Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982), the copyright in a protected work "vests initially in the
author or authors of the work." The author may transfer the copyright or any of its exclusive rights
in whole or in part. The transferee becomes the copyright owner to the extent of the rights trans-
ferred, thus supplanting the author with respect to those rights. See I NIMMER, supra note 4, at
§ 5.01. Different rules apply to "works made for hire" such as movies made under the direction of a
particular studio. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982) provides that "[iun the case of a work made for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author ... and, unless
the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all the
rights comprised in the copyright." For a discussion of what constitutes a "work made for hire", see
1 NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 5.03. Since the author of a "work made for hire" does not own the
copyright in the work, the author must use an employment contract to ensure that her name appears
in connection with the work.
24 See, e.g., Vargas v. Esquire Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947) (artist did not retain the right to
have his name associated with his artwork); Harris v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp.
119 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (author transferred all rights to her story and thus could not complain that her
name did not appear in connection with the work); De Bekker v. Frederick A. Stokes Co., 168 A.D.
452, 153 N.Y.S. 1066 (1915) modified, 172 A.D. 960, 157 N.Y.S. 576, aff'd, 219 N.Y. 573, 114 N.E.
1064 (1916) (author was not entitled to have his name appear in his book since he did not reserve
that right in the publishing contract); Jones v. American Law Book Co., 125 A.D. 519, 109 N.Y.S.
706 (1908) (publisher was under no obligation to publish author's name where the contract made
the publisher sole owner of the copyright). See also 2 NiMMER, supra note 4, at § 8.2 1[E].
25 Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension of Existing Ameri-
can Legal Doctrines, 60 GEo. L. J. 1539, 1556 (1972). Courts tend to interpret the rights that the
author retains narrowly, and the rights that the author conveys broadly. See, e.g., Harris v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). The court's interpretation will, to a
certain extent, depend on the type of work involved, general practice in the field, and the parties'
reasonable expectations. 2 NiMMER, supra note 4, at § 8.21 [E]. See, e.g.,Jones v. American Law Book
Co., 125 A.D. 519, 109 N.Y.S. 706, 709-10 (1908).
26 The common law doctrine of unfair competition developed as an effort to curb fraudulent and
deceptive trade practices and to promote "fair dealing" in the market place. Courts use the doctrine
to prohibit a wide range of competitive practices including misappropriation, trademark infringe-
ment, false representations, false advertising and any other conduct which a court feels violates fair
and honest business conduct. I J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 14-16 (2d ed.
19881 NOTES
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Courts have held that a false description as to origin amounts to a decep-
tive practice under a theory of unfair competition 27 and violates the Lan-
ham Act which prohibits any such false designation.28 In order to
succeed under either theory, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defend-
ant's representation is false or tends to create a false impression; (2) the
representation is material; (3) the representation deceives or is likely to
deceive the public; and (4) the deception is likely to or does cause injury
to the plaintiff.29
With respect to a claim of false designation of an artistic work, an
author would have to prove that the use of another's name in connection
with the author's work tends to deceive the public as to the origin of the
work, and thus deprives the author of the advertising value and goodwill
that would result from having her name associated with the work.30 If
1984). One of the more typical examples of unfair competition involves a plaintiff who claims that
the defendant tried to sell certain goods as those of the plaintiff ("passing off") or 'tried to sell the
plaintiff's goods as those of the defendant ("reverse passing off"). Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602,
604-05 (9th Cir. 1981).
To a great extent, the Lanham Act has supplanted the state law doctrine of unfair competition as
the means of redressing unfair trade practices. See generally Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition:
What Should Be the Reach of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 671 (1984). Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act provides in relevant part that:
Any person who shall affix.., or use in connection with any goods... or any container...
for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including
words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause
such goods.., to enter into commerce .... shall be liable to a civil action.., by any person
who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or
representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
27 Courts most commonly apply the doctrine of unfair competition to deceptive practices involv-
ing the sale of commercial goods and services. However, courts have also applied the doctrine to
product and service equivalents in the literary, artistic, and entertainment fields, including the use of
titles, names, characters, and likenesses. See generally 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 26, at 322-50, 362-
70. In the case of certain literary, artistic and entertainment rights, including the use of titles, char-
acters, and authors' names, the court may require the plaintiff to show that the title or character
name has a secondary meaning in the minds of the public apart from its descriptive aspects. In a
case where the defendant uses her name in connection with another author's work, the court may
require the plaintiff/author to show that the public identifies the author's name with certain works or
ideas. Id. at 348.
28 See, e.g., Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1981) (film distributor's removal of
actor's name from credits and advertising material held actionable under the Lanham Act); L'Aiglon
Apparel, Co. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954) (Lanham Act cause of action
upheld against defendant who used plaintiff's product in advertisement for its product); Yameta Co.
v. Capitol Records, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 582, 586-87 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 393 F.2d 91 (2d
Cir. 1968) (use of plaintiff's name in such a way as to overstate his contributions to record was
actionable). See also Follett v. New Amer. Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). But see
Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357-58 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985)
(court rejected Lanham Act violation claim because defendant's movie was not substantially similar
to plaintiff's play).
29 See generally Yameta Co. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 582, 586-87 (S.D.N.Y), rev'don
other grounds, 393 F. 2d 91 (2d Cir. 1968); Maslow, Droit Moral and Sections 43(a) and 44(i) of the
Lanham Act - AJudicial Shell Game?, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 377, 388 (1980). A plaintiff who seeks
injuctive relief does not have to prove that the false representation actually deceived anyone. 2 J.
MCCARTHY, supra n6te 26, at 358-59.
30 Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1981). Some commentators suggest that this
reasoning may apply not only where another's name appears on the author's work, ("express reverse
passing off"), but also where no name appears on the work ("implied reverse passing off"). In
Montoro, the Ninth Circuit suggests that "implied reverse passing off" constitutes a violation of the
Lanham Act. Montoro, 648 F.2d at 605-07. Under this reasoning, if no name appears on the work,
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the author proves the violation, she may obtain an injunction to prevent
another from claiming credit.31
Use of the doctrine of unfair competition and application of the Lan-
ham Act protect an author not only from having her work attributed to
another, but also from having her name used in connection with the work
of another.3 2 To sustain such a cause of action, the author must show
that the use of her name tends to deceive the public as to her actual
contribution to the work, and that injury is likely to result.3 3 Courts will
also grant relief if use of something other than the author's name would
tend to imply that the author was involved with the work.34 Howeyer, the
cause of action will not succeed as long as proper labeling shows the
extent of the author's contribution. For example, courts have held that
the words 'based on" or "derived from" the work of an author do not
indicate that the author contributed to the work in question.3 5
As an alternative to claims based on unfair competition and violation
of the Lanham Act, an author may argue that the wrongful use of her
name violates a right of publicity3 6 or amounts to defamation.3 7 An ac-
tion for invasion of privacy under a right of publicity stems from the pro-
prietary interest that one has, in one's own identity.3 8 Such an action
the author may also claim a Lanham Act violation for false designation. See 2 NIMMER, supra note 4,
at § 8.21[E].
31 See 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 26, at 55 (Supp. 1987) ("[T]his comes close to creating a gen-
eral right to attribution, similar to the continental 'droit moral paternity' right").
32 Courts most commonly use a theory of unfair competition and application of the Lanham Act
to prohibit the latter type of conduct which they refer to as "palming off" or "passing off". For a
discussion of this practice as well as "reverse passing off", see 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 26, at 237-
38. See also Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 604-05 (9th Cir. 1981).
33 See, e.g., Drummond v. Altemus, 60 F. 338, 338-39 (C.C. Pa. 1894); Follett v. New Amer.
Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Yameta Co. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 279 F.
Supp. 582, 586-87 (SD.N.Y.), revd on other grounds, 393 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1968); Gieseking v. Urania
Records, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 1034, 155 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (1956). The court held in L'Aiglon Apparel
Co. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954) that the Lanham Act gives relief to anyone who
is injured or likely to be injured by the defendant's conduct. Id. at 651. See also Smith v. Montoro,
648 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1981). Courts have interpreted "injury" very broadly. In Montoro, the
court looked to the "vital interest of actors in receiving accurate credit for their work ... " Montoro,
648 F.2d at 608.
34 See L'Aiglon Apparel Co. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954) (picture of
plaintiff's dress used to advertise defendant's dress). For a discussion of the unfair use of distinctive
characterizations, see 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 26, at 368-70.
35 See, e.g., Landon v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 450, 459 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (television credits properly stated that scripts were "based on" plaintiff's stories); Geisel v.
Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (label on dolls properly stated that they
were "based on" plaintiff's illustrations); 2 NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 8.21[D].
36 See, e.g., Maritote v. Desilu Prods. Inc.,, 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883
(1965) (use of Al Capone's name and likeness in television broadcast); Fairfield v. American Photo-
copy Equipment Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (1955) (unauthorized use of plaintiff's
name in advertisement). See generally 2 NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 8.21[D]; I1J. MCCARTHY, supra note
26, at 372-89.
37 See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
38 Four distinct invasions comprise the law of privacy: (1) intrusion upon the seclusion, solitude,
or private affairs of another person; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts concerning
another person; (3) publicity which places another person in a false light in the public eye; and
(4) appropriation of another's name or likeness for personal gain. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 383, 389 (1960). The first three of these torts involve one's right to be free from unwarranted
intrusions into one's solitude. The fourth category involves a property right which courts and com-
mentators commonly refer to as the "right of publicity." See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d
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emphasizes the pecuniary value of certain aspects of a person's personal-
ity and protects those aspects from economic exploitation by others.
Recognizing this type of proprietary interest, courts will generally pro-
hibit the unauthorized commercial use of a person's name.3 9 Under this
reasoning, an author may seek to enjoin the unauthorized use of her
name in connection with a work that she did not create by arguing that
such a use violates a right of publicity.40
Unlike the right of publicity which protects a property right in one's
identity, the tort of defamation protects a personal interest in one's repu-
tation.4 1 Relying on this interest, one may argue that attributing an in-
ferior work to an author will damage the author's reputation and thus
will amount to defamation.42
While in some cases these causes of action offer protection which
resembles the Berne Convention's right to claim authorship, they often
suffer from limitations which do not exist under Berne. For example,
unlike actions based on the right to claim authorship, actions for breach
of contract, defamation, unfair competition, violation of the Lanham Act,
and actions based on the right of publicity all require that the plaintiff
show injury or a likelihood of injury.43 Thus, such causes of action sur-
866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 203 (1954); Prosser, supra at 401-07. Under a right of publicity, courts give a monopoly on
the use of aspects of one's own personality for economic gain. State law sets the boundaries for the
exercise of this right where it exists. Generally, since the right of publicity does not involve invasion
ofsolitude, one does not lose the right by courting the public eye. Similarly, since the right does not
try to redress injury to feelings, a plaintiff need not prove that the conduct resulted in offensive
publicity. The cause of action generally requires only the unauthorized use of one's name or like-
ness for commercial purposes. See Nimmer, supra at 215-16. For a discussion of recent cases which
reunite the right of publicity with its privacy roots, see Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial
Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1199, 1211-15 (1986).
39 Nimmer, supra note 38, at 217-18. E.g., Manger v. Kree Inst. of Electrolysis, 233 F.2d 5 (2d
Cir. 1956); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. 400 F. Supp. 836, 843-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 326, 603 P.2d 425 (1979); Fairfield v. Ameri-
can Photocopy Equipment Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194, 197 (1955). The mere use of a
person's name does not give rise to a cause of action under the right of publicity. Rather, the plain-
tiff must show that the defendant used the plaintiff's name to appropriate the plaintiff's identity for
commercial purposes. W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 852 (5th ed. 1984).
40 See, e.g., Follett v. New Amer. Library Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304, 310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (author
has a right to accurate attribution); Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 1034, 155 N.Y.S.
2d 171, 172 (1956) ("A performer has a property right in his performance that it shall not be used
for a purpose not intended, and particularly in a manner which does not fairly represent his ser-
vice."); 2 NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 8.21[D]. Authors may invoke other aspects of the right of
privacy in order to prevent their names from being used in connection with an inferior work. This
use of privacy law will be discussed under the right of integrity. See infra notes 76-78 and accompany-
ing text.
41 "Defamation is rather that which tends to injure reputation in the popular sense; to diminish
the esteem, respect, good-will or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, de-
rogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him." W. KEETON, supra note 39, at 773 (foot-
notes omitted).
42 See 2 NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 8.21 [D]. This theory more closely resembles the Berne Con-
vention's right of integrity and will be discussed in greater detail in that part of this note. See infra
notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
43 To recover damages in an action for defamation the plaintiff generally must show that the
defamatory conduct impaired the plaintiff's reputation. W. KEETON, supra note 39, at 843. Such
proof may be difficult if an author does not have a reputation in the literary or artistic community.
The other causes of action require a showing that either the defendant's conduct puts the plaintiff at
a pecuniary disadvantage or gives the defendant an unjust economic advantage.
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vive an author, if at all, only to the extent that another plaintiff would be
injured by the omission or wrongful use of the author's name.44 Simi-
larly, while under the Berne Convention an author retains the right to
claim authorship even after the transfer of economic interests, an author
in the United States may waive or assign any interest in her name, thus
defeating any personal claim of injury.45 Finally, in many cases, United
States courts will find that constitutional interests such as freedom of
speech and freedom of the press outweigh an author's ability to control
the use of her name and thus will defeat causes of action which might
otherwise afford some protection.46
B. Right of Integrity
Apart from the right to claim authorship, the Berne Convention
gives an author the right to "object to any distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to," a creative
work that would prejudice the author's honor or reputation. 47 The exact
nature of this right, which commentators commonly refer to as the right
of integrity, depends to a great extent on the laws of the signatory coun-
tries.48 The Berne Convention provides only that the right of integrity,
like the right to claim authorship, shall exist independently of the au-
thor's economic interests and shall continue even after the author trans-
fers such interests. 49 Whether or not this provision allows an author to
alienate or waive the right of integrity remains unclear, although some
44 Courts under a theory of unfair competition or the right of publicity, or through application
of the Lanham Act, generally recognize the right to exploit one's name as a property right which may
be alienated or assigned and, if used to the person's advantage during life, may pass at death. See,
e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288, 290-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d 215
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) (right to exploit the name of Elvis Presley passed to
plaintiffs at his death); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (right
of publicity does not terminate upon death). But see Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc. 345 F.2d 418 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425,
160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 329 (1979) ("[Ihe right to exploit name and likeness is personal to the artist
and must be exercised, if at all, by him during his lifetime"). Rights under defamation and certain
forms of invasion of privacy are personal and generally do not survive one's death. See Price, 400 F.
Supp. at 844; W. KEErON, supra note 39, at 778.
45 Once assigned, those who have the right to exploit one's name also have the right to bring a
cause of action for unfair competition or under the right of publicity or to claim a violation of the
Lanham Act. See Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (right of
publicity is assignable); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323, 329 (1979) (right to exploit one's name and likeness can be assigned). For a discussion of
"implied waiver" of the right of publicity, see 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 26, at 384-86.
46 When a private plaintiff uses the courts as a means to enjoin certain speech, "government
action" exists so as to raise possible first amendment objections. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 26, at
664. In most cases where the defendant's conduct is deceptive, it does not merit first amendment
protection. Id. However, in certain situations, the public's right to know or other public policy
considerations may outweigh one's exclusive right to exploit one's name. 1 J. MCCARTHY supra note
26, at 386-87. For a general discussion of the balancing of copyright interests and first amendment
concerns, see I NiMMER, supra note 4, at § 1.10[B].
47 Paris Text, supra note 6, at art. 6bis.
48 Id. See supra note 15.
49 Paris Text, supra note 6, at art. 6bis. Like the right to claim authorship, the right of integrity
continues fifty years after the death of the author. Individual countries determine who can enforce
the right after the author's death. See supra note 19.
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Berne countries expressly provide that an author cannot do so.50
Clearly, under the Berne Convention, an author cannot object arbitrarily
to any changes to her creative work. Rather, an author may object only
to prejudicial changes. 5 1
The United States does not expressly recognize a right of integrity. 52
However, United States courts in many cases provide the same type of
protection through legal theories purportedly unconnected with a doc-
trine of moral right.5 3
Generally, in the United States, an author who transfers the copy-
right in a work loses all power to dispose of that work except to the ex-
tent that she contractually retains control. Under United States
copyright law, the copyright holder has the exclusive right to exploit an
original work of authorship.5 4 Courts generally hold that the right to
exploit implicitly includes the right of the copyright holder to alter the
work to suit her particular needs or uses.5 5 Unless the author retains an
interest or contractually requires the copyright holder to maintain the
work in its original form, the author generally cannot object on contrac-
tual grounds to any changes. Where the author does retain an interest or
bargains for control, the use of contracts can provide extensive protec-
50 French law, for example, expressly provides that the right of integrity ("droit au respect") is
personal, perpetual, inalienable, and unassignable. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 4. French courts will in
practice, however, often enforce contracts which transfer or relinquish the right of integrity. Id. at
16. For a discussion of the inalienability of moral rights, see Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, in
2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 115, 123-25 (Moral right is personal and thus not capable of transfer but it
can be waived by contract). See also Nimmer, supra note 12, at 523-24 (Article 6bis "means that the
transfer of economic rights does not in and of itself include the transfer of moral rights and does not
necessarily mean that moral rights themselves are incapable of transfer.")
51 Some courts and commentators suggest that this standard creates problems in that, to a cer-
tain extent, it may require a court to make artistic judgments. DaSilva, supra note 4, at 37. See, e.g.,
Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579 (1948), aff'd,
275 A.D. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949). However, the Berne Convention does not seem to require
judgments as to literary and artistic merit. Rather, the inquiry focuses on prejudice to honor and
reputation, an issue which would be familiar to United States courts which make such determinations
now in the areas of privacy and defamation. Courts would have to decide whether to use an objec-
tive or subjective standard with respect to such prejudice. Courts would also have to decide which
community it would use to determine such standards. Given the nature of artistic creation and the
personal nature of the right, a subjective standard seems suitable.
52 See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976); Granz v.
Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., concurring); Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d
522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947); Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S. 2d 813,
818 (1949); Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579
(1948), aff'd, 275 A.D. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949).
53 See infra notes 54-84 and accompanying text. For a discussion of United States equivalents to
the right of integrity, see DaSilva, supra note 4, at 45-48; Nimmer, supra note 12, at 521-23; Roeder,
supra note 16, at 565-72; Strauss, supra note 50, at 132-35.
54 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). See supra note 2.
55 See, e.g., Manners v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 262 F. 811, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (right to
make motion picture from a play must include right to make some alterations, eliminations and
additions); Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 205 Cal. App. 2d 441, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 18 (1962) (inherent in the right to remake a story is the "right to update, modernize and
adapt the story to life in today's generation and employ current methods and techniques"); Prem-
inger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 363, 367, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594, aff'd, 25 A.D.2d 830, 269
N.Y.S.2d 913, aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 659, 219 N.E.2d 431, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1966) ("Implicit in the grant
of television rights is the privilege to cut and edit.")
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tion.56 However, authors often do not have the bargaining power neces-
sary to protect the integrity of their work. The transfer of interests in
creative works usually involves standard form contracts which give the
transferee broad powers to dispose of the property. 57 Even where the
author does have bargaining power, contracts generally offer protection
only against those types of alterations, distortions or modifications that
the parties expressly contemplated at the time of transfer.58
To alleviate the harshness of this result, United States courts look to
other legal theories to provide redress for an author whose work has
been distorted, altered, or otherwise modified. For example, some
courts suggest that an author may object to material changes under a
theory of unfair competition.59 A cause of action under unfair competi-
tion may arise when the licensee of a work changes the work such that
attribution to the author would deceive the public and put the author at
an unfair economic disadvantage. 60
In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos. ,61 the Second Circuit extended
this theory by applying the Lanham Act to an author's claim of distor-
tion.62 In Gilliam, the British comedy group Monty Python sought to en-
join the American Broadcasting Companies (ABC) from showing an
edited version of its television show. The group argued that the "editing
done for ABC mutilated the" original work and that consequently the
broadcast of those programs as the creation of Monty Python violated
56 Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author's "Moral Right", 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 487, 499
(1968) (key against mutilation of creative works in the United States is contract rights). See, e.g.,
Manners v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 262 F. 811, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (author retained right to
approve any alterations, eliminations, or additions); Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc.
570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 819 (1949) ("The time for the artist to have reserved any rights was when he
and his attorney participated in the drawing of the contract"); Fairbanks v. Winik, 206 A.D. 449, 201
N.Y.S. 487, 488 (1923) (plaintiff retained right to supervise direction, approve stories and inspect
footage); Royle v. Dillingham, 53 Misc. 383, 104 N.Y.S. 783, 784 (1907) (plaintiff retained the right
to supervise general production and to consent to changes, alterations, or additions). See also 2
NiMMER, supra note 4, at § 8.2 1[E].
57 Nimmer, supra note 12, at 524; see also Comment, supra note 25, at 1559-60 (suggesting that
courts should interpret vague literary and artistic standard form contracts against the drafter or as
unconscionable).
58 See supra note 25. Courts disfavor a theory of implied reservation of rights. See, e.g., Goodis v.
United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1970) (court should look at intent and
expectations of parties as well as customs of the artistic or literary community); Vargas v. Esquire,
Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947) (Reservation of rights "will not be presumed; it must be
expressed and clearly implied"); 2 NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 8.21 [C]. For a discussion of the effect
of such an interpretation when new techniques such as colorization are involved, see infra notes 97-
100 and accompanying text.
59 For a discussion of unfair competition, see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
60 Roeder, supra note 16, at 567-68. See, e.g., Granz v. Harris 198 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1952)
(sale of abbreviated version of record using plaintiff's name could be enjoined under a theory of
unfair competition); Drummond v. Altemus, 60 F. 338, 339 (C.C. Pa. 1894) (publication of altered
form of plaintiff's reports); Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) ("[Tlhere is enough in plaintiff's allegations to suggest that he may yet be able to prove a
charge of unfair competition or otherwise tortious misbehavior in the distribution to the public of a
film that bears his name but at the same time severely garbles, distorts or mutilates his work.")
61 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
62 Other courts have suggested that the Lanham Act might apply but did not expressly apply it.
See, e.g.,Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). For a discus-
sion of application of the Lanham Act, see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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the Lanham Act . . ,,63 The Second Circuit, expressly recognizing a
cause of action under the Lanham Act, enjoined future broadcasts. 64
The court found that the edited version omitted essential elements of the
story line and "impaired the integrity of appellants' work and repre-
sented to the public as the product of appellants what was actually a mere
caricature of their talents." '65
If the use of a theory of unfair competition and application of the
Lanham Act continue in the direction of Gilliam, United States authors
will receive protection which resembles the Berne Convention's right of
integrity. 66 Even with this expansion, however, important differences re-
main. For example, in order to have a cause of action under either unfair
competition or the Lanham Act, an author must establish that the mis-
representation has impaired or is likely to impair the author's reputation
and cause economic injury.67 The Berne Convention, on the other hand,
protects against any prejudicial conduct, potentially a much broader cat-
egory of injury. 68 Furthermore, the courts base causes of action under
unfair competition and the Lanham Act on the right to exploit one's own
name, a property right which the author can assign or transfer. Along
with the transfer of this interest, the author relinquishes the right to
claim that an inferior version of her work creates an economic disadvan-
tage.69 Arguably, an author subject to the Berne Convention may also
relinquish the right of integrity; however, where possible, such an action
generally requires express language to that effect. 70
Even if an author retains the right to exploit her own name, reme-
dies under a theory of unfair competition or through application of the
Lanham Act may prove insufficient. Courts may allow the defendant to
rectify any false representation by affixing labels or legends which prop-
erly identify the work and disclaim the plaintiff/author's participation in
any alteration, modification or distortion.71 While such a remedy allevi-
63 Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24.
64 In the first part of its opinion, the Second Circuit determined that the unauthorized editing
infringed on Monty Python's copyright in the work. The court held that the group, by reserving all
rights not granted under the contract, had retained the right to control alterations. Id. at 21. Not all
courts and commentators agree with this contractual interpretation. See 2 NIMMER, supra note 4, at
§ 8.21 [C]. See also supra notes 55 & 58. Perhaps the deciding factor is the degree of alteration. See,
e.g., Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 363, 372, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594, aft'd, 25 A.D.2d
830, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913, aft'd, 18 N.Y.2d 659, 219 N.E.2d 431, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1966) (while the
privilege to make minor cuts may be implied in the contract, the power to make major cuts may not).
65 Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25. For a criticism of the extension of the Lanham Act in this direction,
see Goldberg, Commentary: The Illusion of "Moral Right" in American Law, 43 BROOLYN L. REV. 1043
(1977).
66 Presently, no court has gone as far as the Gilliam court in providing moral rights protection
through application of the Lanham Act.
67 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The plaintiffand the defendant need not compete in
order for the plaintiff to have a cause of action. The plaintiff must show a likelihood of economic
damage either through loss of sales or through damage to reputation which causes a decline in
income. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 26, at 354-56.
68 Paris Text, supra note 6, at art. 6bis.
69 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
70 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. See also Goldberg, supra note 65, at 1049. The Gil-
liam court, however, would enjoin the defendants even in that situation. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25, n. 13
("We are doubtful that a few words could erase the indelible impression that is made by a television
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NOTES
ates any economic disadvantage, it does not soften the injury to feeling
that an author may suffer.72
In the United States, causes of action for defamation and invasion of
privacy remedy injuries to feelings. Some courts have extended these
theories to protect an author's personal interest in having the integrity of
her work respected. 73 Of the two theories, defamation offers the greater
protection. An action for defamation protects a person from that which
tends to impair her reputation or standing in the community. 74 Under
this theory, an author may argue that the publication or display of an
inferior version of her work tends to damage her reputation and elicit
ridicule or contempt from the public or from members of a particular
artistic or literary community.75 A similar cause of action may arise under
a theory of false light invasion of privacy.76 False light invasion of pri-
vacy protects a person from highly offensive publicity.77 Under this the-
ory, an author may argue that the alteration, distortion, or modification
of her creative work causes embarassment, scorn, uninvited publicity,
and emotional distress. 78
Like a doctrine of moral right, causes of action for defamation and
invasion of privacy protect personal interests. Courts, however, face seri-
ous limitations when they attempt to apply these theories to offer the
broadcast, especially since the viewer has no means of comparing the truncated version with the
complete work in order to determine for himself the talents of plaintiffs.")
72 Roeder, supra note 16, at 567-68. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 ("Although such decisions are
clothed in terms of proprietary right in one's creation, they also properly vindicate the author's
personal right to prevent the presentation of his work to the public in a distorted form.")
73 See, e.g., American Law Book Co. v. Chamberlayne, 165 F. 313, 316 (2d Cir 1908) (acknowl-
edging the possibility of recovering damages for libel resulting from publication of mutilated or
altered form of author's work); Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis & Co., 8 N.Y.2d 187, 168 N.E.2d 643,
203 N.Y.S.2d 812, 815 (1960), app. denied, 9 N.Y.2d 755, 174 N.E.2d 609, 214 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1961)
(action for libel in the inaccurate use of plaintiff's name in connection with revised edition of his
book); Locke v. Benton & Bowles, Inc., 253 A.D. 369, 2 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151-52 (1938) (action for libel
in the inaccurate presentation of newswriter's observations).
74 See W. KEETON, supra note 39, at 773. A prima fade case requires that: (1) the defendant
communicate the statement to someone other than the plaintiff; (2) the statement is defamatory; and
(3) the statement defames and concerns the plaintiff. Id. at 802. In recent years, courts have wres-
fled with the standard of liability to which a defendant will be held. In New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court held that a public plaintiff must show actual mal-
ice, defined as knowledge that a statement was false or reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity, in
order to recover against a media defendant. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. This standard does not
apply to private individuals who may, if state law allows, recover for negligence against a media or
non-media defendant. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749 (1985);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
75 See, e.g., Geisel v. Poytner Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also supra
note 73. The removal of the plaintiff's name from the work does not eliminate the cause of action.
A defamatory meaning may attach to the plaintiff even though the defendant makes no such refer-
ence as long as others reasonably identify the work with the plaintiff. W. KEETON, supra note 39, at
783.
76 For a discussion of invasion of privacy, see supra note 38.
77 W. KEETON, supra note 39, at 864. The statements which shed false light do not have to be
defamatory to be actionable. A plaintiff may recover for false accounts which are highly offensive to
the plaintiff and need not prove injury to reputation, but rather may recover for emotional distress.
The plaintiff must, however, prove that the defendant's conduct was outrageous. Generally this
requires that the defendant have deliberately falsified information regarding the plaintiff. Id. at 865-
66.
78 See, e.g., Landon v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 450, 459 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577, 580 (1942).
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same types of protection that exist under the Berne Convention. For
example, unlike the right of integrity, the rights of action under defama-
tion and false light invasion of privacy generally do not survive the per-
son claiming them.79 These rights also may not apply to all persons
equally. An action for defamation, for example, requires that the defam-
atory statement tend to impair the plaintiff's reputation. Many authors,
however, do not have a following in the literary or artistic community
and thus may find it difficult to claim that a certain action harms their
reputation. 0 On the other hand, courts may find that persons who seek
publicity to a certain extent may waive claims for false light invasion of
privacy.8 1 Even an author who does have a cause of action under either
theory may find the remedies limited. Courts generally do not grant in-
junctive relief in an action for defamation.8 2 Some courts do allow in-
junctive relief, where practical, in actions for invasion of privacy. 83 In
either case, the court may deny any relief if the defendant properly la-
belled the altered work as "based on" the author's work or if the work
has entered the public domain.8 4
II. Colorization of Black and White Films
In theory, United States law offers some protection for artistic ex-
pression. In practice, however, it falls far short of the protection which
the Berne Convention and laws made pursuant to Berne offer.85 The
79 W. KEETON, supra note 39, at 778. See, e.g., Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418, 419
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965) (action brought by Al Capone's widow objecting to fiction-
alized account of Capone's life); James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 2d 650, 344 P.2d 799,
801 (1959) (action brought by Jesse James' daughter-in-law objecting to account of her husband's
life as Jesse James' son). Some state statutes expressly include actions for defamation of a deceased
person. W. KEETON, supra note 39, at 779.
80 Comment, supra note 25, at 1549-50. In most cases, the question of the extent of the plain-
tiff's reputation would go to the issue of damages. If the plaintiff does not have a reputation then
the publication of an inferior version of her work will not cause much damage.
81 W. KEETON, supra note 39, at 867. Some courts have held that, for certain purposes, those
who seek publicity consent to invasions of their privacy. See, e.g., Estate of Hemingway v. Random
House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 781-82 (1968). Where the plaintiff
consented to publicity, it is less likely that she will be able to prove the outrageous conduct required
for a false light action. W. KEETON, supra note 39, at 866-67.
82 DaSilva, supra note 4, at 45.
83 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977), in which the
Court, in distinguishing the right of publicity from false light invasion of privacy, states: "In 'false
light' cases the only way to protect the interests involved is to attempt to minimize publication of the
damaging matter ......
84 See, e.g., Landon v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 450,459 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
("Any person may truthfully state that a work is 'based on' or 'suggested by' the work of that au-
thor"); Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("This claim must also
fail because defendants' activities... do not imply that plaintiff created, designed or approved of the
dolls"); Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578
(1948), aft'd, 275 A.D. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949) (no implication of plaintiff's participation exists
where the work is in the public domain).
85 See, e.g., Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, (1949) (artist
could not object to the painting over of his mural); Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578 (1948), aff'd, 275 A.D. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949)
(Soviet composers could not enjoin use of their music in a manner derogatory to their country);
Meliodon v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 328 Pa. 457, 195 A. 905 (1938) (court refused to order
defendant to remove altered form of plaintiff's sculptural work).
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recent debate over the colorization of black and white motion pictures
highlights these deficiencies.8 6
A. The Colorization Process
As commonly used, the term "colorization" refers generally to the
several techniques which use computers to add color to black and white
films. 8 7 The colorization process involves five basic steps: (1) the black
and white film is transferred onto a videotape; (2) the film is broken
down frame by frame, scene by scene; (3) an art director develops a color
plan for each scene and for the film as a whole; (4) a computer operator
selects the appropriate colors from an electronic palette; and (5) a high
speed computer tracks these colors through other frames based on simi-
larities in shadings of gray in the black and white film.8 8 Art directors
research the coloring of the film's actors, as well as the actual props, cos-
tumes and sets. Color selections reflect this research as well as a study of
the shadings of the film, but to a great extent depend on the aesthetic
judgment and personal taste of the art directors as to the colors that will
be consistent with the mood of the original film. 8 9
B. Application of United States Law
Many people oppose efforts to colorize black and white films. 90 Yet
despite this opposition, no recourse seems available even for those who
participated in the production of the original films.9' The limited protec-
86 The ongoing debate between "purists" and "colorists" began in 1984 with the showing of the
first colorized version of a black and white film, Miracle on 34th Street. The battle continues today as
members of the artistic community wage a seemingly losing effort to prevent the coloring of such
classic black and white films as Casablanca and Citizen Kane.
87 Two processes exist for adding color to black and white films: (1) the chromoloid process;
and (2) the colorization process. The "chromoloid process" produces three prints of the film in red,
blue, and green and combines these prints into a single color film. "Colorization" generally involves
the use of a computer to distribute hand picked colors throughout each frame of a film. 34 PAT.,
TRADEMARK, & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 836, at 223 (June 25, 1987). This note will focus on the
"colorization" process.
88 Id. Three companies: Hal Roach Studios (Colorization Inc.), Color Systems Technology, Inc.,
and American Film Technologies, Inc., use the "colorization" process. New York Times, Apr. 22,
1987, at D-7, col. 1. See also 34 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) No. 836, at 223 (June 25,
1987). The process costs between $300,000 and $500,000 per film. Los Angeles Times, Jan. 19,
1988, at 4-2A, col. 1. Since 1984, more than fifty colorized movies have been released with another
fifty scheduled to be released this year. Los Angeles Times, Jan. 19, 1988, at 4-2A, col. 1. These
movies include It's a Wonderful Life, Bells of St. Mary's, The Maltese Falcon, Yankee Doodle Dandy, and
Topper. The Turner Entertainment Co. with its Turner Broadcasting System (TBS) has been the
leading exhibitor of the colorized versions of such films.
89 New York Times, June 24, 1987, at A-27, col. 1.
90 Opponents of colorization argue that colorizing black and white films distorts the creative
effect of the original. They claim that the addition of color changes the atmosphere, mood, and tone
of the black and white footage and destroys the artistic impression that the director intended to
create. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 12, 1986, at 6-1, col. 3. Proponents, on the other hand, argue that
a market exists for colorized films that does not exist for their black and white counterparts. They
suggest that prohibiting colorization would infringe upon the freedom of consumers to judge
whether these works have artistic merit. Proponents also argue that the market for colorized films
gives owners of old films the financial motivation to preserve them and gives audiences a chance to
see films that otherwise would not be readily available. 34 PAT., TRADEMARK & CoPvimGrrJ. (BNA)
No. 830, at 34, (May 14, 1987).
91 See Federing, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 20, 1987, at 75 (discussing Orson Welles, direc-
tor of Citizen Kane, "who observed that no truly great performance had ever been given on color film.
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tion which art receives in the United States does not readily extend to
either the authors of motion pictures or to the black and white films
themselves.
General copyright principles give an author the right to object to
colorization but only if the author 92 holds the copyright and only to the
extent that any other rights transferred do not include the right to
colorize. 93 Under the current statute, the copyright in an original work
of authorship expires fifty years after the life of the author.94 Many black
and white films, however, predate the current statute and have already
entered the public domain. 95 Even if a valid copyright does exist, the
creative forces behind the film do not usually hold it. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)
provides:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of
this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a
His view was that color detracted from the pathos, the empathy, the drama, that color bridged the
last gap between imagination and reality.") Id. Citizen Kane has not as yet been colorized. Recently,
however, the Turner Broadcast System acquired rights to the film as part of its acquisition of a
portion of the RKO film and television library.
Many directors, producers, and actors associated with black and white films have argued against
colorization. For example, Woody Allen writes: "I have chosen on a number of occasions, even
fought for the privilege to tell stories with black and white photography. Indeed, the different effect
between color and black and white is often so wide it alters the meaning of scenes." Allen, N.Y. REV.
OF BOOKS, Aug. 13, 1987, at 38. Similarly, James Stewart stated that when he watched the colorized
version ofIt's a Wonderful Life, "he turned it offin disgust halfway through the film." Nat'l. L.J.,July
27, 1987, at 10, col. 2. He labelled it "morally and artistically wrong."' Id. at 11, col. 3.
92 The term "author" with respect to films will refer to the creative forces behind the films,
including directors, screenwriters, cinematographers, and producers.
93 The right to colorize would fall under the bundle of exclusive rights which a copyright holder
has in an original work of authorship. These rights include the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). The United States Copyright Office has determined that some com-
puter-colorized films contain sufficient original authorship in their color selection to justify registra-
tion as derivative works. 34 PAT., TRADEMARK, & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) No. 836, at 214 (June 25,
1987). The Copyright Office, in its Proposed Deposit Rule, established five criteria for determining
when a colorized film is of sufficient originality to justify registration:
(1) Numerous color selections must be made by human beings from an extensive color
inventory.
(2) The range and extent of colors added to the black and white work must represent
more than a trivial variation.
(3) The overall appearance of the motion picture must be modified; registration will not
be made for the coloring of a few frames or the enhancement of color in a previously
colored film.
(4) Removal of color from a motion picture or other work will not justify registration.
(5) The existing regulatory prohibition on copyright registration based on mere variations
of color is confirmed.
34 PAT., TRADEMARK, & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 836, at 224 (June 25, 1987).
Opponents of the colorization process argue that colorized films do not contain a sufficient
degree of original authorship to qualify as derivative works. Issues involving the copyrightability of
colorized films under existing laws are beyond the scope of this note. For a complete discussion, see
Bader, A Film of a Different Color: Copyright and the Colorization of Black and White Films, 5 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENTERTAINMENTJ. 497, 505-23 (1986).
94 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1982) Copyright protection continues during this period as long as the
copyright holder fufills all statutory requirements.
95 Under the 1909 Copyright Act, copyright protection lasted for twenty-eight years from the
date of first publication, subject to renewal for an additional twenty-eight year period.
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written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in
the copyright.9 6
Generally, the director, cinematographer, screenwriter, and other crea-
tive forces behind a film "work for hire". Thus under section 201, the
studios which employ them hold the copyright.
Although the director and others who contribute to the making of a
film do not hold the copyright and do not have the right to object to
colorization under general copyright principles, they may contract for
such a right.97 For example, a director may, as a condition of employ-
ment, require that the studio agree not to colorize any of the films which
she directs. The use of such provisions may help prevent the colorization
of black and white films made in the future. It does not, however, protect
the majority of black and white films which existed well before the pro-
cess was developed.9 8 The directors of those films could not have con-
templated such a development and thus would not have retained the
power to object to it.9 0
Even those who hold the copyright in black and white films may have
no power to prevent colorization once they've transferred the right to
display or reproduce the film. Courts may interpret the transfer of such
rights to include the right to colorize. 10 0
While at best, theories of contract and copyright provide minimal
options for an author who objects to colorization, other theories ordina-
rily used to protect authors in the United States provide no relief at all.
For example, in order to have a cause of action under the Lanham Act or
for unfair competition, the author of a black and white motion picture
must establish that colorization of the film tends to injure her reputation
and will likely cause economic injury. 0 1 A director, for instance, might
argue that colorization produces an inferior color version of a black and
white film, which may damage the director's reputation for creating supe-
96 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982). See, e.g., Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co., 270 Cal. App. 2d
886, 76 Cal. Rptr. 106, 108 (1969) (interpretation of employment contract as creating rights in em-
ployer). This definition of author differs from that under a doctrine of moral right because United
States law focuses on economic rights while a doctrine of moral right focuses on personality rights.
Thus, United States copyright law protects the studio which puts money into a film while a doctrine
of moral right protects the creative forces who infuse the film with aspects of their personalities.
97 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. The creative forces behind a film will, however,
very rarely have sufficient bargaining power to contract for rights akin to the right of integrity.
98 This includes over 17,000 black and white motion pictures and over 1,400 black and white
television series in the United States alone. New York Times, Apr. 22, 1987, at D-7, col. 1.
99 The director and other creative forces may have retained other rights with respect to the film.
However, courts generally interpret these types of provisions narrowly to include only that contem-
plated by the parties at the time they made the contract. Thus, the rights retained generally would
not include the right to object to colorization. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
100 See supra note 93. See also supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. Since, however, the
United States Copyright Office views a colorized movie as a derivative work, the transferee of the
right to display or reproduce a film may not acquire the right to colorize. Under 17 U.S.C. § 106
(1982), the right to prepare derivative works is a separate exclusive right of the copyright holder. A
copyright holder may argue that the transfer of the right to exploit does not affect the separate right
to prepare derivative works and thus does not include the right to colorize. See 2 NIMMER, supra note
4, at § 8.09[A].
101 See supra notes 26 & 60 and accompanying text.
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rior works.' 0 2 Since, however, most black and white films were made
over thirty years ago, even those closely identified with a certain film
would find it difficult to prove that the colorized version in any way in-
jures their current reputations.10 3 Because of the collaborative nature of
filmmaking, most of those involved in the process are not sufficiently
identified with a film to make even an initial claim of impairment.10 4
Similar problems exist with respect to causes of action for invasion
of privacy and defamation. Like actions based on the Lanham Act and
unfair competition, actions for invasion of privacy and defamation, in
some cases, may afford relief for personal and reputational injury caused
by the display of an inferior version of an author's work.' 0 5 However,
because of the narrowness of these causes of action, neither provides ef-
fective relief from colorization. 0 6 Arguably, the colorization of black
and white films damages the reputations of the colorizers more than the
reputations of those involved with the original films. Generally, those
who know the reputations of those involved with an original film do not
associate them with the colorized version of the work. Thus an author
would find it difficult to prove the reputational injury necessary for defa-
mation or the offensiveness and embarrassment necessary to show false
light invasion of privacy.' 0 7 Where the author has died, as is the case
with many of the older black and white films, a cause of action may not
exist at all.' 08
102 See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. Even if the author can prove injury, this argu-
ment still depends on judicial extension of Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d
Cir. 1976).
103 An even tougher task exists with respect to proving damages. With some notable exceptions,
the commercial success of films does not depend on the audience knowing the work of the director
or other creative forces behind the film (aside from the actors). A director could argue, however,
that the showing of the colorized version impairs her ability to get more work. This stretches the
Lanham Act and the doctrine of unfair competition even further than Gilliam. Since courts have
been reluctant to accept Gilliam, it seems doubtful that they would go even further. The argument is
made even more difficult by the fact that many of those involved in the making of older black and
white films have died. Courts generally recognize that the right to exploit one's name may pass at
death. However, this reasoning does not apply where the only claim for damages is present impair-
ment of one's ability to get work.
A person who proves that a colorized version of a black and white film violates the Lanham Act
may still find it difficult to prevent colorization. Courts have held that proper labels will remedy the
false designation underlying a violation of the Lanham Act. See supra notes 35 & 71 and accompany-
ing text. Thus, a court may only require that the colorizer indicate that the film has been
"colorized." But see Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 25, n.13 (2d Cir. 1976).
104 See supra note 27.
105 See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
106 See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
107 The same difficulties apply here as apply to causes of action under the Lanham Act and unfair
competition. Many of those involved in the filmmaking process, either because of their position or
the passing of time, are not closely identified with particular films. Such persons would find it diffi-
cult to prove the type of public ridicule that forms the basis for defamation or the embarassment that
forms the basis for false light invasion of privacy. The cause of action under defamation may be
further limited by the proper use of the "colorized" designation. See supra note 84 and accompany-
ing text.
108 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. For example, the lateJohn Huston, director of such
classics as The Maltese Falcon and Treasure of the Sierra Madre, vehemently opposed the colorization of
his films. Nat'l. L.J.,July 27, 1987, at 11, col. 3.
C. Application of a Doctrine of Moral Right
No one has as yet challenged colorization under United States law or
under any laws made pursuant to the Berne Convention. Even theoreti-
cally, however, United States law offers little chance of relief. The Berne
Convention, on the other hand, in certain circumstances, may give an
author the right to object to colorization.
The Berne Convention gives an author the right to object to any
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory ac-
tion with respect to a work, which would be prejudicial to her honor or
reputation. 09 At the very least, colorization amounts to the modification
of a creative work and thus in all cases satisfies the first aspect of the
Berne Convention's right of integrity." 0 Whether colorization pre-
judices an author's honor or reputation depends both on the specific fac-
tual situation involved and how each country interprets the language of
the provision."' Since the doctrine of moral right stems from personal
rather than pecuniary interests, this provision does not require the eco-
nomically oriented injury to reputation that forms the basis of United
States defamation actions.12 Rather, the provision seems to contem-
plate allowing an author to object to that conduct which changes the au-
thor's personal expression and damages the work's literary and artistic
value." 13 Under this standard, an author may object to colorization if the
process impairs the artistic expression of the original film. For example,
if the black and white shadings uniquely contributed to the mood or tone
of the film, or the message which the author meant to convey, the addi-
tion of color would destroy the integrity of the work." l4
On a practical level, application of a doctrine of moral right to cine-
matographic works may create several problems. For example, the Berne
Convention does not clearly define who qualifies as the "author" of a
cinematographic work. Article 15(2) provides only that: "The person or
body corporate whose name appears on a cinematographic work in the
usual manner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed
to be the maker of the said work." 1' 5 Interpretation of this language
depends to a great extent on the laws of the individual signatory coun-
109 Paris Text, supra note 6, at art. 6bis.
110 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
111 Commentators criticize the language of this provision as overly vague. Such vagueness, how-
ever, satisfied countries such as Great Britain who wanted to join the Berne Convention buit were
reluctant to seriously change their existing laws. I S. LADAS, supra note 9, at 592. This flexibility may
eventually alleviate the United States' fears that joining the Berne Convention will require material
changes in existing laws. See infra notes 141-142 and accompanying text. At least one commentator
would prefer that the right of integrity protect an author from every action which would distort the
manner in which an author wished to show her work. I S. LADAS, supra note 9, at 592. The Berne
nations will likely leave such an interpretation to the discretion of the individual countries.
112 See I S. LADAS, supra note 9, at 591 ("[T]here may be cases of alteration of an author's work,
which cannot be deemed to injure the reputation of the author, and yet are prejudicial to his moral
interest in the integrity of his creation.")
113 Id.
114 See supra note 90.
115 Paris Text, supra note 6, at art. 15(2).
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tries.116 On its face at least, Article 15(2) would include as authors: the
director, producer, screenwriter and anyone else whose name appears as
maker of the film.1 17 In addition, article 14bis provides that: "The owner
of copyright in a cinematographic work shall enjoy the same rights as the
author of an original work ... "; and "Ownership of copyright in a cine-
matographic work shall be a matter for legislation in the country where
protection is claimed."1 "" Most motion pictures do not result from the
effort of only one person but rather represent the combined talents of
many people. The Berne Convention does not give any guidance as to
how several authors can protect their efforts in a creative work.
Applying the Berne Convention provisions to colorization also
presents difficulties since proponents of the colorization process view the
final product as an adaptation or derivative work rather than a modifica-
tion of the original work. 119 The issue then becomes to what extent an
adaptation violates the right of the author of the original work to object
to the mutilation, distortion or modification of the work. By their defini-
tion, adaptations require a certain amount of modifications which might
otherwise violate the original author's right of integrity. Generally,
either a contract will exist between the author and the adapter or the
original work will have entered the public domain. 120 In either case, the
author may still argue that the adaptation violates the integrity of the
original work. 121 At this point, however, the author's right of integrity
may only apply to the extent that the adaptation distorts the spirit of the
original. 122 The extent to which colorization distorts the spirit of the
116 French law, which provides broad protection under the right of integrity, defines the "author"
of a cinematographic work as the persons who brought about the intellectual creation. In the ab-
sence of proof to the contrary, such authors include: (1) the author of the script; (2) the author of
the adaptation; (3) the author of the dialogue; (4) the author of the musical compositions; and (5) the
director. Giocanti, Moral Rights: Authors' Protection and Business Needs, 10 J. OF INT'L. LAw & ECON.
627, 629-30 (1975). But see I S. LADAS, supra 9, at 461 (criticizing this definition).
117 Paris Text, supra note 6, at art. 15(2). This should be distinguished from art. 14bis which
creates a presumption in favor of the producer of the film with respect to exploitation rights in a
cinematographic work. Article 14bis(2)(b) provides that:
[I]n the countries of the Union which, by legislation, include among the owners of copy-
right in a cinematographic work authors who have brought contributions to the making of
the work, such authors, if they have undertaken to bring such contributions, may not, in the
absence of any contrary or special stipulation, object to the reproduction, distribution, pub-
lic performance, communication to the public by wire, broadcasting or any other communi-
cation to the public, or to the subtitling or dubbing of texts, of the work.
Paris Text, supra note 6, at art. 14bis. See also Ulmer, International Copyright After the Paris Revisions, 19
BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y. 263, 266 (1972). It is not entirely clear that either the "maker" of art. 15 or
the "copyright holder" of art. l4bis qualifies as the "author" as the term is used under art. 6bis with
respect to moral rights. For an historical discussion of the special problems involving cinemato-
graphic works, see S. ROTHENBERG, COPYRIGHT LAw 753-56 (1956). See also I S. LADAS, supra note 9,
at 458-69.
118 Paris Text, supra note 6, at art. 14bis.
119 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
120 In the more typical situation, a literary work is adapted for use as a motion picture. In that
case, certain modifications are necessary to transfer the work from one medium to another. In com-
parison, colorization more closely resembles mere alteration since it is not an alteration imposed by
the nature of the medium. See I S. LADAS, supra note 9, at 590-92.
121 DaSilva, supra note 4, at 34-35.
122 Id. at 34. See also I S. LADAS, supra note 9, at 590. ("Ordinarily, the adapter must respect only
the intrinsic form of the work, its subject, its artistic or literary substance, but not its extrinsic form,
the literary or artistic expression.")
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black and white film depends on the nature of the original film and the
extent to which the black and white filmmaking contributes to the charac-
ter of the film.123
III. Legislative Efforts
The ineffectiveness of United States equivalents to a doctrine of
moral right have prompted many efforts towards reform. On the federal
level, these efforts include proposed legislation implementing a doctrine
of moral right' 24 and proposed legislation specifically dealing with
colorization. 125 In addition, members of the artistic and literary commu-
nities continue to push for United States adherence to the Berne Con-
vention in the hopes that such an action will ensure greater protection
for creative works. 126
A. Express Adoption of a Doctrine of Moral Right
The current debate over colorization focuses attention once again
on the lack of substantive protection for art in the United States. While
legislators have often acknowledged this problem, past attempts to rec-
tify the situation have proven unsuccessful. 127 The latest of these efforts
is the proposed Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987 which Senator Edward
Kennedy introduced in August of 1987.128 The Act would amend the
copyright laws to give the author of a pictorial, graphic or sculptural
work of fine art the right to claim authorship of such a work, as well as
the right to disclaim authorship of any works which have been distorted,
mutilated or otherwise altered. 29 The author may assert infringement
of copyright for such actions whether or not she actually holds the
copyright.'30
The Kennedy bill would substantially increase protection for art in
the United States. The Act does not, however, completely parallel a doc-
123 See supra note 90.
124 See infra notes 127-131 and accompanying text. While implementation of a doctrine of moral
right on the federal level has not as yet been successful, three states, California, New York, and
Massachusetts, have enacted comprehensive statutes designed, in varying degrees, to protect the
integrity of artistic works. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. ARTS & CUL-
TURAL AFF. LAw § 14.03 (McKinney Supp. 1988); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231 § 85(S) (Law. Co-op
1986). For a general discussion of these statutes, see Gantz, Protecting Artists'Moral Rights: A Critique
of the California Art Preservation Act as a Model for Statutory Reform, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 873 (1981);
Koven, Observations on the Massachusetts Art Preservation Act, 71 MASS. L. REv. 101 (1986); Note, The New
York Artists'Authorship Rights Act: Increased Protection and Enhanced Status for Visual Artists, 70 CORNELL L.
REV. 158 (1984). Note that the Ninth Circuit has held that United States copyright laws do not
preempt certain state copyright initiatives. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 978 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980) (The Court focuses on the extent to which the two laws "function harmo-
niously rather than discordantly.") Since federal copyright law does not address the issue of moral
rights, it does not seem to preempt state moral rights statutes.
125 See infra notes 132-139 and accompanying text.
126 See infra notes 140-144 and accompanying text.
127 See Note, supra note 124, at 159, n.6.
128 S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
129 The bill also provides full copyright protection for all works of fine art even if the author fails
to affix notice to the work. Id. at § 5. The legislation would also provide royalty payments for resale
of such work. Id. at § 3(d)(1),(2).
130 After the author's death, her estate would have the exclusive right to exercise these rights.
This protection continues for fifty years after the author's death. Id. at § 3(c)(1).
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trine of moral right since it applies only to pictorial, graphic and sculp-
tural works of recognized stature. 31 It does not, for example, prevent
the distortion, mutilation or alteration of cinematographic works and
would not enable the author of a black and white film to object to its
colorization. Thus the bill, while recognizing the need to protect artistic
expression, offers a solution that falls short of the needs of many mem-
bers of the artistic and literary communities.
B. Film Integrity Act of 1987
While efforts to provide general protection for art in the United
States have historically suffered from the apathetic responses of legisla-
tors and the public, the debate over the colorization of black and white
films has been heated and unrelenting.' 3 2 As a specific response to the
intense opposition to colorization, Representative Richard A. Gephardt,
in May of 1987, introduced the Film Integrity Act of 1987.133 This bill
would amend the copyright laws to allow the artistic author of a motion
picture to prevent material alterations of the work.' 34 The alterations
prohibited under the proposed Act specifically include colorization.135
The Act provides that: "[I]n the case of a motion picture, once the work
has been published, no material alteration, including colorization, of the
work shall be permitted without the written consent of the artistic au-
thors of such work." 13 6
These provisions provide protection which parallels the Berne Con-
vention right of integrity and in many ways exceeds it, at least with re-
spect to colorization. For example, the bill provides that the artistic
author of a motion picture may transfer the right to consent only to an-
other qualified artistic author.' 3 7 Furthermore, at the author's death, the
right passes either to another artistic author or to the deceased author's
successors or heirs at law.138
The Film Integrity Act suffers both because of its narrowness and
because of its breadth. Like the Kennedy bill, the Act fails to address the
problems of certain members of the literary and artistic communities.
The Act protects motion pictures, but does not enable the authors of
other types of artistic works to protect the integrity of their expression.
For the authors of cinematographic works, the Act offers protection
which in many ways surpasses that of the Berne Convention. While op-
ponents of colorization applaud the extent of this protection, the expan-
siveness of these provisions with respect to motion pictures will most
likely doom the legislation. A legislature reluctant to adhere to the
131 The bill defines a "work of fine art" as a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work of recognized
stature as defined by the trier of fact taking into account the opinions of members of the artistic
community. Id. at § 2.
132 See supra note 90.
133 H.R. 2400, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
134 The Act defines "artistic author" of a motion picture as the principal director and the princi-
pal screenwriter of the work. Id. at § 3.
135 Id. at § 2.
136 Id.
137 Id. Compare supra note 50 and accompanying text.
138 Id Compare supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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Berne Convention because of its doctrine of moral right will not likely
accept a bill which provides even greater protection even in the narrow
context of cinematographic works.' 39
C. Adherence to the Berne Convention
Even if Congress adopts the Film Integrity Act, which does not ap-
pear likely, the lack of substantive protection for other forms of art in the
United States would persist. Increasingly, proposed solutions to this
problem center on the possibility of the United States adhering to the
Berne Convention and its doctrine of moral right.' 40 While in the past
such proposals have proven unsuccessfil, recent developments including
United States withdrawal from UNESCO and increasing dissatisfaction
with the UCC, as well as international pressure to conform to interna-
tional copyright standards may finally persuade the United States that its
participation in the Berne Convention is long overdue.' 4 1
Several major obstacles exist, however. Opponents of the Berne
Convention fear that adoption of a doctrine of moral right would inter-
fere with the usual practices governing the transfer and use of literary
and artistic works. 142 Other commentators argue that existing statutory
and common law protection already conforms to the Berne provisions
and that adherence would not require new legislation or any material
changes to existing laws. 143 Still others contend that United States' ad-
herence to the Berne Convention would create rights and duties with
respect to artistic works even without further legislation. 144
Despite the obstacles, the United States' adherence to the Berne
Convention would provide the most efficient and effective means of en-
suring the protection of artistic expression. Unlike the Film Integrity Act
and the Visual Artists Rights Act, adherence to the Berne Convention
would protect all literary and artistic works and would crystallize current
protection into an express body of rights.
IV. Conclusion
As the example of colorization demonstrates, United States law does
not currently provide adequate protection for the personal expression
embodied in an artistic work. Common law and statutory equivalents to
139 See generally Sandison, The Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention: The Amerdan
Experience, 11 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 89 (1986).
140 See supra note 6.
141 See supra note 7. Other reasons forjoining the Berne Convention include: the possibility of an
increased voice in international copyright decisions; and protection against future retaliation by
member countries whose nationals do not receive adequate protection in the United States. See
Hearings, supra note 6, at 148-50 (statement of Irwin Karp, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group
on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention).
142 Obstacles also exist in the areas of notice and registration, compulsory licenses, and the man-
ufacturing clause. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 127-28 (statement ofDonaldJ. Quigg, Acting Com-
missioner for Patents and Trademarks).
143 See generally Nimmer, supra note 12, at 524. See also Hearings, supra note 6, at 155-56 (state-
ment of Irwin Karp, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne
Convention).
144 See Hearings, supra note 6, at 196 (statement of Prof. Donald Wallace, Jr.).
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a doctrine of moral right contain serious limitations. Such concepts do
not apply in every situation and often are subject to the vagaries ofjudi-
cial interpretation. The United States lacks an express body of rights
that would allow the author of a creative work to protect her authorship
and the artistic integrity of the work against distortions, mutilations, and
modifications such as colorization.
The solution to this problem lies in the express adoption of a doc-
trine of moral right. In particular, the United States' adherence to the
Berne Convention would provide the protection which existing law lacks.
Adherence would require the United States to adopt a doctrine of moral
right and would give authors and artists the means to prevent the kind of
artistic violation that colorization represents.
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